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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COMINT
 CHARGE TO

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10237

TO: **SERIALS:** Embassy ANKARA PRIORITY 73
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- INFO: Embassy MOSCOW 208

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY Houston DATE 4/7/66

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Ambassadors of all NATO capitals other than Paris, London, and Bonn (which will be informed through Embassies Washington and by direct communication to Heads of Government) should at earliest opportunity inform Foreign Minister or highest ranking Foreign Ministry official available along following lines:

U.S. Government has been conducting fundamental and searching review of Berlin problem in all aspects. Process given stimulus by Aide-Memoire RM/R Khrushchev gave us in Vienna and direct challenge to West that it imports.

While focus of attention in struggle against Soviet expansionism is certainly now Berlin, this must be evaluated against background of world conflict

Re
Submitted by: F. W. FECMash, Jr.
EUR:GER:MHillenbrand/dr 7/20/61

Transmitter transmission and
acknowledgment received by:

The Secretary

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DECT 06-06-06-06-06-06

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conflict and considered in this light.

We have made serious efforts to stop arms race and relax tensions, but Soviet belligerence has made this impossible. In view of increasing gravity of world situation, it seems only elementary prudence that member countries of NATO should make a greatly heightened effort to create a strong NATO military posture.

As concerns direct Soviet challenges on Berlin, we are convinced that a peaceful solution of present controversy depends on ability of Alliance to convince Soviet leaders we prepared to meet this challenge.

President Kennedy expects present general terms our conclusions to American people in an address next Tuesday.

In general, we have been thinking along following lines.

Our mutual interests require continued presence of Western forces in Berlin. These interests also require that we maintain security and viability of West Berlin and physical access thereto.

Soviet objectives appear to include consolidation of Communist position in Eastern Europe, an early significant weakening of Western position in Berlin and eventual absorption of City into East Germany. Soviets probably also seek, as useful bi-products a demonstration of Western impotence in order to weaken/NATO and inflict serious blow to Western prestige.

Our central problem at this juncture is to protect our mutual vital interests without war if possible, and to put ourselves in best possible position if war should be forced on us.

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This will require:

- 1) action on broad front to convince Khrushchev of Western determination to defend our vital interests;
- 2) united purpose of people of NATO countries based on clear public recognition of issues involved and confidence that every reasonable step has been taken to defend our vital interests by measure short of war;
- 3) unity of Alliance based on clear recognition that NATO's vital interests are involved and confidence that Allied position is reasonable and that Soviets forcing issues beyond tolerable point;
- 4) development of an agreed strategy should military steps be necessary;
- 5) development of other countermeasures programs including economic sanctions;
- 6) development of concerted diplomatic measures to explore all reasonable avenues for settlement; and
- 7) marshalling of maximum support of world opinion to make Soviet aggressive moves as costly as possible.

Taking into consideration nature of Soviet threat, need to preserve our position in Berlin, and means to do so that we have at our disposal, we have concluded that it is essential that all of our countries initiate immediately significant build-up of military strength of type suitable both for peak crisis as well as prolonged tension. We believe this course will give diplomacy maximum flexibility.

~~Conclude our President will ask Congress today for supplementary defense budget of approximately three billion dollars to add to three billion dollars already requested over previous level of forty billion dollars. We contemplate having~~

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To this end, President will ask Congress Wednesday for supplementary defense budget of 3.2 billion dollars, making a total of approximately 6 billion dollars over the budget submitted by President Eisenhower in January.

This would provide us with progressively stronger forces in months ahead, giving us capability of moving six additional divisions to Europe by end of year, or at any time thereafter, if our allied decision is that situation warrants this. We would also have available supplementary units of tactical and transport aircraft and increased naval strength, especially in field of anti-submarine warfare. Further, we are acting immediately to increase by 50 per cent number of our bomber aircraft on ground alert status.

We believe that strength required to meet Soviet challenge with confidence cannot be achieved unless other NATO members make comparable effort. We will be unable to succeed in convincing Soviet Union of our determination or in building requisite strength unless a high level of combat-ready forces is urgently achieved.



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This will involve additional cost and sacrifice in all our countries. But this is time of clear and imminent danger for Alliance. We do not believe we can convince Soviets of our willingness to face greater risks which may be ahead unless we are ready to bear burdens of a period of growing peril. U.S. Government will, in course of forthcoming consultation, be making specific proposals as to strengthened NATO military posture which seems urgently required, as basis for consideration of other NATO countries.

U.S. also plans considerable increase in Civil Defense efforts, especially in field of fallout shelters as an efficacious means of reducing Soviet estimates of their own ability to inflict damage on this country by thermo-nuclear attack.

These military measures alone are not enough, and we must rapidly complete Allied plans for initiation of program of diplomatic, political, and other non-military measures, including economic sanctions. To this end, we believe whole range of Berlin contingency planning must be reviewed with objective of achieving more precise Governmental commitments to their execution.

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It is of great importance, however, that we not permit these new programs and expenditures to affect negatively more positive and constructive programs we are conducting around world. To do so would be to present Soviets with major collateral victory.

Course suggested here is intended to deter Soviets by impressing them with our unquintessential unqualified resoluteness of purpose and thus improve possibilities for an acceptable arrangement.

We should, therefore, explore opportunities for Western initiatives at an appropriate time, for example, through our Ambassadors in Moscow or in form of proposal for Four-Power meeting of Foreign Ministers. Other possibilities must be considered.

Basic to all this, of course, is need for continuous Allied consultation, beginning with present call on Foreign Minister by Ambassador and continuing in NAC, with Finletter report Monday and subsequent report after Four Foreign Ministers meet Paris.

Our hope is that these measures will convey to Soviets, while they are still in the process of making decisions, convincing evidence of our firmness of ultimate purpose. We are convinced that this course will protect interests of West Berliners, Alliance and entire free world without a resort to war, while also ensuring the best possible posture should ~~our peaceful efforts fail~~ FOR USRC, BERLIN AND TOKYO:

Finletter should also use foregoing as basis of presentation at Monday NAC and for immediate briefing of Stikker. On personal and strictly confidential basis Lightner should also outline US views to Brandt and, within his discretion, Reischauer to Kosaka or highest ranking Foreign Ministry official available.

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